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Abstract
We use a Barro-Becker model of endogenous fertility, in which parents are subject to
idiosyncratic shocks that are private information (either to labor productivity or taste
for leisure), to study the efficient degree of consumption inequality in the long run. The
planner uses the trade off between family size and future consumption and leisure, in
addition to the usual variables, to provide incentives for workers to reveal their shocks.
We show that in this environment, the optimal dynamic contract no longer features
immiseration in consumption. We also discuss the implications of the model on the
long run properties of family size in the optimal contract and show that the long run
trend in dynasty size can be either positive or negative depending on parameters.
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Introduction

A common feature of efficient contracts in dynamic settings with private information is the
presence of a negative drift in consumption of the agent over time as the contract evolves
– immiseration (see Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas (1992)
and Phelan (1998) as examples). This arises due to the desire, by both parties, to use future
∗
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payoffs as a means to provide current incentives. Having a downward drift on average, also
makes it cheaper to provide incentives in the future and hence, allows for the provision of
better insurance in the current period.
This creates a problem for trying to use these models to study some questions of interest
in welfare economics. For example: What is the optimal amount of consumption inequality
to balance incentives and social insurance? When the contracting problem features immiseration as a feature of the optimal contract, this question has no well defined answer –
inequality should grow without bound as time goes on and almost every member of society
should have a time path of utility that is declining over time.
One solution to this dilemma has been provided in Phelan (2006) and Farhi and Werning
(2007, 2010) (and implicitly earlier in Atkeson and Lucas (1992)) where different periods
in the contracting problem correspond to successive generations in a dynastic model. In
that setting, these authors show that if the social planner puts higher weight on subsequent generations than parents’ themselves do, the optimal contract features mean reversion
and hence, there is a non-degenerate stationary distribution over consumption. Implicit
in this formulation is the assumption that family size is fixed – each agent is ’replaced’ in
the subsequent period by exactly one agent – no population growth (or shrinkage) is allowed.
In this paper, we study the form of the optimal incentive contract in a dynamic setting
when fertility choice is added to the problem through dynastic altruism. This is a natural
extension of the standard model when a period is a generation. There are two, complementary, reasons for making this change. First, as (de la Croix and Doepke, 2003) have shown,
including family size in overlapping generations models is crucial to match the empirical
relationship between income inequality and mean output growth. Second, it is of interest
to know how this extra margin for incentive provision affects the long run features of the
optimal contract – e.g., consumption and labor supply.
We show that in this case, the optimal dynamic contract no longer features immiseration
even when private and social weights on children are aligned. Indeed, with Barro and Becker
(1989) (and Becker and Barro (1988)) style dynastic preferences and i.i.d. shocks, we show
that there is a stationary distribution over consumption, continuation utilities, etc., under a
variety of assumptions about the nature of private information and the costs of children.
In some cases – when the cost of children is purely in terms of consumption goods – the
2

result is particularly stark: there is a unique continuation utility that is given to all children
independent of the history of shocks in the family. Further, consumption, labor supply and
family size are all i.i.d. That is, all future incentives for parents are provided through family
size and none through children’s utility.
In our model, we get an extreme version of the (Farhi and Werning, 2007) mean reversion result: When the cost of raising children is in terms of consumption goods continuation
utility is i.i.d. even when social and private discounting are identical. The reason for this is
that the planner has two instruments to vary future promised utility to parents: the number
of children and the promised utility to each child. Because of a homotheticity property of
the Barro and Becker dynastic formulation, it turns out that per child future utility is held
fixed while the number of children is moved up and down only as a function of the parent’s
shock to provide incentives. Equivalently, under a natural implementation of the optimal
contract, total bequests for the next generation and the number of children are moved up
and down proportionally leaving per capita bequests independent of parent’s wealth and/or
history of past shocks.
We go on to study the long run properties of dynasty size under the optimal contract. We
show that family size can either shrink or grow over time depending on the parameters of the
model. If, for whatever reason, the discount factor is less than the inverse of the (endogenous)
rate of return on capital, we show that family size shrinks over time (i.e., fertility is below
replacement) in the optimal contract. On the other hand, if, as seems to be true empirically,
the discount rate exceeds the inverse of the rate of return on capital, two additional key
factors determine the long run properties of population size: the curvature of utility and the
amount of uncertainty about ‘type.’ To address this, we study a special case of the model
(goods costs for children and a taste shock to the value of leisure) and show that if either
the curvature of utility is small or the level of uncertainty is small, family size grows without
bound. Thus, in this case there is neither immiseration in continuation utility nor family size.
Finally, we study the contracting problem in the more realistic case when the costs of
children are a mixture of both goods and time. In this case, the properties of the optimal
contract are more nuanced – a mix of family size and children’s utility are used to provide
incentives and the i.i.d. property no longer holds. Rather, a limited form of history independence is shown to hold. Formally, continuation utility for all children of a parent with the
highest shock is independent of history while for other shocks a similar property holds when
parents’ continuation utility is sufficiently low. These properties are enough to show that
3

a stationary distribution over per capital variables exists under some additional, technical,
assumptions.
Our paper is related to the large literature on dynamic contracting including Green
(1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), Atkeson and Lucas (1992), Phelan (2006), Farhi and
Werning (2007, 2010) (among many others). These papers established the basic way of
characterizing the optimal allocation in endowment economies where there is private information. They also showed that, in the long run, inequality increases without bound, i.e. the
immiseration result. Phelan (1998) shows that this result is robust to many variations in
the assumptions of the model. Moreover, Khan and Ravikumar (2001) establish numerically
that in a production economy, the same result holds and although the economy grows, the
detrended distribution of consumption has a negative trend. We contribute to this literature
by extending the model to allow for endogenous choice of fertility. We employ the methods
developed in the aforementioned papers to analyze this problem.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we study our basic dynamic contracting
problem when family size is included and the costs of children are in terms of goods. In
section 3 we study population dynamics implied by the optimal contract. In section 4, we
allow for costs to be in terms of parents’ time. Finally, section 5 concludes.

2

The Model and Basic Results

In this section, we lay out the basic model that we will analyze in an infinite horizon setting
and provide some basic technical results concerning the efficient allocation. Our model is
an extension of the intergenerational interpretation of Atkeson and Lucas (1992) Farhi and
Werning (2007, 2010) with private information about preferences over leisure. The novelty
of our approach is that we include fertility choice in the model with dynastic altruism.
Time is discrete from 0 to ∞. At date 0, the economy is populated by N−1 agents. Each
agent lives for one period. Agents, when alive, draw labor productivity shocks, can consume
and have children. The cost of raising a child is in terms of consumption good. We assume
that it takes a units of consumption good to raise each child. We will report the results with
‘time cost’ included in section 4.1
1
Goods and time costs of this form are best thought of as short cuts for situations in which parents care
directly about consumption of their children (the goods cost) and the amount of time they spend with them
(the time cost). This formulation is standard and simplifies the analysis.
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Preferences. Following Barro and Becker (1989) and Becker and Barro (1988), we assume
that the family head has preferences over own consumption, c0 , own leisure, `0 , own fertility,
n0 , and per child utility, u1 given by:
U0 = u(c0 , `0 ) + βg(n0 )u1 ,
in which β is the intergenerational discount factor. Assuming that children are also altruistic
toward their children (i.e., the grandchildren of the family head), and so on, we obtain by
substitution:
U0 = u(c0 , `0 ) + βg(n0 )u(c1 , `1 ) + β 2 g(n0 )g(n1 )u(c2 , `2 ) + . . . .
As in Barro and Becker (1989) and Becker and Barro (1988), this simplifies when it is
assumed that g(·) is iso-elastic, g(n) = nη . In this case, it follows that g(n0 )g(n1 ) = g(n0 n1 ),
etc. Under this assumption, the utility of the family head is given by:
U0 = u(c0 , `0 ) + βnη0 u(c1 , `1 ) + β 2 (n0 n1 )η u(c2 , `2 ) + . . . .
We will assume that utility is additively separable in consumption and leisure2 , and we will
write flow utility in terms of amount of efficiency units of labor, y 0 s, in place of levels of
leisure:3
u(c, y) = u(c) + h(y, θ).
We assume h (y, θ) is strictly decreasing and strictly concave in y, and hy ≡
increasing in θ.

∂h
∂y

is strictly

Written in this way, θ can be interpreted as a productivity shock, as well as a shock to
the value of leisure. For example, assuming that each agent is endowed with one unit of time
to work in each period and assuming that θ is a productivity shock,
y
u(c) + h(y, θ) = u(c) + ĥ 1 −
,
θ


in which ĥ(·) is the utility function over leisure and it is strictly increasing and strictly
2
This is standard assumption in dynamic Mirrleesian models. see for example Albanesi and Sleet (2006);
Farhi and Werning (2010); Golosov et al. (2003); Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006, 2007); Kocherlakota (2005,
2010) among many others.
3
Alternatively, one can think of y = θ · l as output that is required from worker of type θ.
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concave. Similarly, if θ is a taste shock, assume that
1
u(c) + h(y, θ) = u(c) + ĥ(1 − y).
θ

Information. The set of possible types is given by Θ = {θ1 < · · · < θI }. We assume that
θt is drawn from Θ in each period according to the probability distribution π(·) and that
these draws are independent across time. A history of shocks up to and including period t
is represented by θt = (θ0 , ..., θt ). We assume that the planner can observe the amount of effective labor units for each individual (y), but cannot observe θ. Furthermore, for analytical
tractability, we assume that a strong law of large numbers holds so that if an individual has
n children, a fraction π(θ) of them are of type θ.
Technology. There is a constant returns to scale production function F (Kt , Yt ) where Kt
P
is aggregate capital and Yt = θt π (θt ) yt (θt ) is aggregate effective labor hours. The initial
level of capital is given by K0 . For now, we assume that the rate of return on capital, R is
fixed, i.e., the production function is given by
F (K, Y ) = RK + Y.
We consider the case of endogenous R below when we discuss the implications of the model
for population dynamics in section 3.
t
t
Allocation. An allocation is a vector {ct , yt , nt }∞
t=0 where ct : Θ → R+ , yt : Θ → R+ and
nt : Θt → R+ . Here, ct (θt ) is per capita consumption of a generation with history θt ; yt (θt )
is the amount of per capita effective labor units this generation supplies; nt (θt ) is number
of children that each individual in this generation has.

2.1

The Contracting Problem
∞

Consider a social planner who offers a contract {ct (θt ) , yt (θt ) , nt (θt )}t=0 to each dynasty
in period t = 0. Each dynasty chooses a reporting strategy σ = {σt }, which is a sequence
of functions σt : Θt+1 → Θ that maps a history of shocks θt into a current report θ̂t ∈ Θ.
Any strategy σ induces history of reports σ t = (σ0 (θ0 ) , . . . , σt (θt )) with σ t : Θt+1 → Θt+1 .
We denote the set of all possible reporting strategies by Σ0 . Each person in generation t
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in a dynasty which has a reporting strategy σ receives ct (σt (θt )) units of consumption, will
supply yt (σt (θt )) units of efficiency labor units and will have nt (σt (θt )) kids.
We study the problem of a planner that minimizes the cost of delivering utility W0 to
the first generation parents and has to provide incentives for truthful reporting of types.
Define Nt (θt−1 ) = N−1 × n0 (θ0 ) × n1 (θ0 , θ1 ) × ... × nt−1 (θt−1 ) as the current population
of a cohort (in date t) whose ancestors received the history of shocks of θt−1 . We write the
contracting problem as
∞ X
X





1
min
π θt Nt θt−1 ct θt + ant θt − yt θt
∞
t
t
t
t
{ct (θ ),yt (θ ),nt (θ )}t=0
R
t
t=0
θ

subject to

∞ X
X
t=0


η 

 
β t π θt Nt θt−1
u ct θt + h yt θt , θt ≥ W0

(1)

θt

and
∞ X
X
t=0


η 

 
β t π θt Nt θt−1
u ct θt + h yt θt , θt ≥

θt
∞
XX
t=0


η 

 
β t π θt Nt σt−1 θt−1
u ct σt θt
+ h yt σt θt , θt

θt

for all σ ∈ Σ0

(2)

in which equation (1) and (2) are promise keeping and incentive compatibility constraints.4
Note that the objective and constraint set in the above problem my not be convex due
to terms that involve multiplication of fertility (or population) -which is a choice variableby other allocations. Therefore, we follow Alvarez (1999) and reformulate the problem in
terms of aggregates rather than per capita variables. For any history θt , define Ct (θt ) =
Nt (θt−1 ) ct (θt ) and Yt (θt ) = Nt (θt−1 ) yt (θt ) to be aggregate consumption and aggregate
effective labor unit for a generation with history θt whose ancestors received history of
4

Note that if W0 is such that the profit earned at the solution to this problem is 0, this problem is the
dual (assuming convexity) of a planning problem where agent utility is maximized.
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shocks of θt−1 . Using this notation, we can rewrite the contracting problem as:5
∞ X
X




1
t
t
t
t
−
aN
θ
−
C
θ
Y
θ
min
π
θ
t+1
t+1
t+1
{Ct (θt ),Yt (θt ),Nt+1 (θt )}∞
Rt
t=0
t
t=0

(3)

θ

subject to
∞ X
X

t

t



β π θ Nt θ


t−1 η

θt

t=0




 
Ct (θt )
Yt (θt )
u
+h
, θt
≥ W0
Nt (θt−1 )
Nt (θt−1 )

(4)

and
∞ X
X
t=0

 



Ct (θt )
Yt (θt )
u
β π θ Nt θ
+h
, θt
≥
Nt (θt−1 )
Nt (θt−1 )
t
θ



 
∞ X
X


Yt (σt (θt ))
Ct (σt (θt ))
t
t
t−1 η
, θt
+h
β π θ Nt σt−1 θ
u
Nt (σt−1 (θt−1 ))
Nt (σt−1 (θt−1 ))
t
t=0
t

t




t−1 η

θ

for all σ ∈ Σ0

(5)

Using standard arguments for the i.i.d. shock, this problem can be reformulated as a
dynamic programming problem with state variables W , promised utility to current parents
and N , the current population. Thus, we can show that the above problem is equivalent to
the following functional equation:
V (N, W ) =

min

C(θ),Y (θ),N 0 (θ),W 0 (θ)

X
θ


1
0
0
π (θ) C (θ) + aN (θ) − Y (θ) + V (N (θ) , W (θ))
R
(P)


0

subject to
X
θ

  




C (θ)
Y (θ)
η
0
π (θ) N u
,θ
+ βW (θ) = W
+h
N
N

5

(6)

The resulting problem may still not be convex. We need extra assumptions on preferences to guarantee
concavity of the period utility in consumption, efficiency units of labor and population. Also, it is standard
and well known that incentive constraints may not be convex. In the next section we state sufficient conditions
on preferences that guarantee the convexity of the problem.
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and
(



 
Y (θ)
C (θ)
0
η
+h
,θ
+ βW (θ) ≥ N u
N u
N
N
η

C(θ̂)
N

!
+h

Y (θ̂)
,θ
N

!)
+ βW 0 (θ̂)
∀θ, θ̂ ∈ Θ,
(7)

in which W 0 (θ) and N 0 (θ) are future promised utility and dynasty population for a parent
who receives shock θ in the current period.
It can be shown that the value function from this problem has a homotheticity property
and so, it can be equivalently be formulated in per capita terms6 . That is, if we define
η w)
, v̂(N, w) = v(w) will not depend on N and satisfies the following funcv̂(N, w) = V (N,N
N
tional equation (note that all choices are, once again, per capita variables):
v (w) =

min

c(θ),y(θ),n(θ),w0 (θ)

X
θ


1
0
π (θ) c (θ) + an (θ) − y (θ) + n (θ) v (w (θ))
R


(P’)

s.t.
X

π (θ) c (θ) (u (c (θ)) + h (y (θ) , θ) + βn (θ)η w0 (θ)) = w

(8)

θ

u (c (θ)) + h (y (θ) , θ) + βn (θ)η w0 (θ) ≥ u(c(θ̂)) + h(y(θ̂), θ) + βn(θ̂)η w0 (θ̂)
∀θ, θ̂ ∈ Θ. (9)

Here, n (θ) is the number of children for a parent who receives shock θ and w0 (θ) is the
expected promised utility to each of his children.

2.2

Stationary Distribution of Per Capita Variables

In this section, we show that the per capita variables from the contracting problem of the
previous section have a stationary distribution. This is in marked contrast to the situation without fertility where all endogenous variables trend to their lower bounds (see Green
(1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990) and Atkeson and Lucas (1992)) – immiseration. More6

See Hosseini et al. (2009) for a formal proof of this result
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over, from any initial condition (N0 , W0 ) we jump to the stationary distribution in one period.
This follows because of simple characterization for continuation utilities – a property that
we call ‘resetting.’ This is that the expected promised utility for every child is the same,
independent of the history of the parent. Because of this property, it also follows that the
consumption, hours and efficiency units of labor are i.i.d. Thus, when the cost of raising
children is only in terms of consumption goods and shocks are i.i.d., the optimal contract
has an extreme lack of history dependence once fertility is introduced.7
This result depends on one additional (strong) assumption on the solution to the contracting problem from the previous section. This is that the solution can be derived from
the first order conditions from problem (P) (and that the solution to the FOC’s is unique).
Of course, this will follow automatically if value function V (·, ·) is both strictly convex and
differentiable. In the next section, we show that in some cases, when θ is a taste shock to
the utility value of leisure, these assumptions on V can be derived from first principles.8
Under these assumptions, we can use the first order conditions from problem (P’) to
characterize the properties of the optimal contract.
Proposition 1 Assume that V (·, ·) is strictly concave and differentiable and that the solution to problem (P) (and (P’)) is interior. Then,
1. n (θt ), c (θt ), and y (θt ), t = 1, 2, ... are i.i.d.
2. n (θ) = n (θ, w), c (θ) = c (θ, w), and y (θ) = y (θ, w) are all monotone increasing in θ.
As a first step in proving part 1, we will give a partial characterization of the solution
in terms of continuation utilities, w. Let µ(θ, θ̂) and λ be multipliers on constraints (8) and
(9). Taking first order conditions with respect to n (θ) and w0 (θ) in problem (P’) gives us
the following two equations:




X
X
1
µ(θ, θ̂) −
π (θ) a + v (w0 (θ)) = βηn (θ)η−1 w0 (θ) λπ (θ) +
µ(θ̂, θ) ,
R
θ6=θ̂
θ̂6=θ


X
X
1
µ(θ, θ̂) −
µ(θ̂, θ) .
π (θ) n (θ) v 0 (w0 (θ)) = βn (θ)η λπ (θ) +
R
θ6=θ̂
7

θ̂6=θ

The situation is more complex when the costs of children is in terms of parental time. Although there
is still a stationary distribution over per capita variables, they are not i.i.d., so that there is more history
dependence in the optimal contract. See the more detailed discussion of the time cost case in section 4 below.
8
In appendix C we show that this result holds even in a sequence formulation of the problem without
relying on convexity and differentiability. We focus on the recursive formulation here for better exposition.
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If we divide these two equations we obtain:
w0 (θ)
a + v (w0 (θ)) /R
=
η
.
n (θ) v (w0 (θ)) /R
n (θ)
The right hand side is the marginal rate of substitution between number of children and
promised utility to each child. The left hand side is the marginal rate of transformation.
In other words, it is the ratio of marginal costs of having one more child, Ra + v (w0 (θ)),
and marginal cost of raising promised utility of each child, n (θ) v (w0 (θ)). This condition
simplifies to:

Ra + v (w0 (θ)) = ηw0 (θ) v 0 (w0 (θ)) .

(10)

For intuition, imagine the planner who wants to deliver a certain level of utility to the
parent in the future. Once the planner decides about the level of future utility to the parent,
it needs to find the mix of the number of children and promised utility to each children that
delivers that level of utility. Let’s keep the future utility to the parent – that is βn (θ)η w0 (θ)
– fixed. Increasing the number children by one has the cost Ra + v (w0 (θ)) in terms of the
future consumption good. On the other hand, to keep the future utility of parents constant
0 (θ)
implies that promised utility to each child has to go down by η wn(θ)
. This reduction in the
0

(θ)
in the units
promised utility to each child has a cost saving effect of n (θ) v (w0 (θ)) × η wn(θ)
of the future consumption good. The marginal cost of increasing the number of children
and the marginal cost saved from reducing each child’s promised utility must be equal at
the optimal contract. Otherwise, the planner can change the combination of n (θ) and w0 (θ)
and reduce the cost of delivering the same future utility to the parent. This implies that
equation (10) must hold at the optimal contract.

From our assumption that value function in problem (P), V , is strictly convex and differentiable, it follows that ηwv 0 (w) − v (w) is strictly decreasing.9 Thus, there is a unique
solution to equation (10). Notice that in this equation, the only endogenous variable that
appears is the continuation value for the children of an adult who experienced the shock θ
in the current period, w0 (θ).
There are two important properties of this equation: First, promised utility to the parent,
w, does not appear in the equation. This implies that promised utility for each children,
9

See appendix A
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w0 (θ), is independent of promised utility of the parent, w – formally, w0 (θ, w) = w0 (θ) for
all w. Thus, promised utility of future generations is ‘reset’ each period independent of the
history of past shocks to the family.
Second, this equation does not depend on θ either. From this it follows there is a level of
promised utility w∗ such that w0 (θ) = w∗ for all θ ∈ Θ. We state this result as the following
lemma:
Lemma 1 Assume that value function in problem (P), V , is strictly concave and continuously differentiable and that the solution is interior. Then, there is a degenerate distribution
over per child continuation utilities at w∗ where w∗ is the unique solution to (10).
If follows immediately from this lemma that the per capita allocations are only a function
of current shock to parents and not on the history of shocks. Formally, let c (θ, w), y (θ, w),
n (θ, w) and w0 (θ, w) be policy functions that are solutions to the problem P’. We construct
allocations ct (θt ), yt (θt ) and nt (θt ) using these policy functions. First, recall that w0 (θ, w) =
w∗ for some w∗ and therefore wt (θt ) = w0 (θt , wt−1 (θt−1 )) = w∗ for all θt and all t and any
initial promised utility w0 . Therefore, the per capita allocations are:


ct θt = c θt , wt−1 θt−1 = c (θt , w∗ )


yt θt = y θt , wt−1 θt−1 = y (θt , w∗ )


nt θt = n θt , wt−1 θt−1 = n (θt , w∗ )
and hence they depend only on current shock realization, θt , which is assumed to be i.i.d.
Note that, as a result of lemma 1, if we know the value of w∗ and v (w∗ ), then the efficient
allocations are the solution of the following static problem
∗

v (w ) =

min

c(θ),y(θ),n(θ),w0 (θ)

X
θ



1
π (θ) c (θ) + an (θ) − y (θ) + n (θ) v (w∗ )
R



s.t.
X

π (θ) c (θ) (u (c (θ)) + h (y (θ) , θ) + βn (θ)η w∗ ) = w

θ

u (c (θ)) + h (y (θ) , θ) + βn (θ)η w∗ ≥ u(c(θ̂)) + h(y(θ̂), θ) + βn(θ̂)η w∗ ,

∀θ, θ̂ ∈ Θ.

This problem is equivalent to a static Mirrlees problem with two consumption goods, c and n.
12

Note that in this problem, the margin of choice between consumption and fertility is undistorted. Therefore, if c (θ) is monotone in θ, so is n (θ). If the utility function u (c) + h (y, θ)
satisfies the single crossing property, using standard arguments, we can establish that y (θ)
and c (θ) are monotone increasing functions of θ. This concludes the proof of proposition 1.
This results of proposition 1 do not hold in general, they hold because of the special assumption that the cost of children (i.e., a) is completely in terms of goods – children do not
take any parental time to raise. When there is a time cost for children, the ‘resetting’ property (lemma 1) only holds for the highest type (undistorted types) and at the very bottom of
the promised utility distribution (i.e., low w). We will discuss this in more details in section 4.
The results of proposition 1 and lemma 1 imply that the long run distribution of future
promised utilities is concentrated on w∗ . i.e., in contrast to the case where fertility is not
included (e.g. Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990) and Atkeson and Lucas (1992)),
there is not a downward drift in future utilities (at least not in per capita terms). Note that
this does not require any particular assumptions on the social discount rate (as in Farhi and
Werning (2007, 2010)).
Unlike standard models of dynamic contracting, where incentives to parent are provided
only by changing the promised utility to each child, in our environment, incentives to parents are provided using a combination of promised utility to each child and the number of
children a parent has. Given the homotheticity of the Barro-Becker formulation, the planner
will use fertility more heavily to provide incentives. Hence, promised utility is not used at
all for incentive provision.
This is an extreme result in that it says that there is no history dependence of ‘wealth’ at
all – promised utility of children is independent of the shock received by the parent. This
is something that is unique to this particular example – in which there is no time cost for
raising children. As an intermediate case, it can be shown that if the goods cost of children
depends on the type of the parent – a(θ) – continuation utility depends on the type of the
parent, but not on the promised utility to the parent. Thus, in this case, w0 (as well as other
per capita allocations) is M A(1).
10

The intuition for our result can best be understood in two steps. First, since the shock
10

Note that v(w) is the different between present value of income and expenditure so it can be thought of
as wealth. Lack of history dependence in promised utility is equivalent to no history dependence in wealth

13

is only to the utility of leisure and the costs of children are entirely in terms of goods, the
optimal contract features an ‘undistorted’ choice between current consumption and future
children/future consumption for all types of parents (i.e., for all θ). Second, the Barro–Becker
model of dynastic altruism has a natural homotheticity property in aggregate allocations,
i.e. let U (C, Y, N, θ) = N η (u (C/N ) + h (Y /N, θ)), then




 
λY
λC
+h
,θ
U (λC, λY, λN, θ) = (λN ) u
λN
λN
  


C
Y
η η
=λ N u
+h
,θ
= λη U (C, Y, N, θ) .
N
N
η

Now consider the problem 3. The objective in that problem is linear in C , N and Y . This
together with the homotheticity property discussed above, implies that the aggregate allocations in problem 3 are homogenous of degree one in W0 (promised utility to the head of
the dynasty). Hence, the ratio of aggregate consumption Ct (θt ) (and Yt (θt )), to the dynasty
population, Nt (θt−1 ), is independent of W0 after any history θt – in particular after one
period. Therefore, the per capita allocations in the first period are independent of W0 . The
same intuition applies to future periods.
If part of the costs of children are in terms of parental time a more limited version of this
characterization result still holds. In that case there is no history dependence in continuation
utility only for types whose allocations are undistorted – typically for the highest (or lowest)
shock. We will overview this result in section 4. 11

2.3

A Special Case: Taste Shocks

As can be seen from the previous section, the technical difficulty that arises is to show that
the value function is strictly concave and differentiable. Once we have these properties, our
main result – that continuation utility is reset to the same value for the children of all types
– follows directly from the first order conditions of the contracting problem.
In this section, we show that there is at least one case in which we can dispense with
these two extra assumptions. This is true when θ is the taste shock to the value leisure:
1
u(c) + h(y, θ) = u(c) + v(1 − y).
θ
11

For more details we refer the reader to Hosseini et al. (2009).
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In this case, we will show that there is a simple transformation so that the constraint set
in the minimization problem P is convex and the objective function is strictly convex. Let’s
define:




C (θ)
Y (θ)
η
η
U (θ) = N u
, H (θ) = N h 1 −
.
N
N
For a given U (θ) and H (θ), we have

C (θ) = N u−1 N −η U (θ) .
Also, h−1 (N −η H (θ)) = 1 − Y (θ) /N , therefore

Y (θ) = N − N h−1 N −η H (θ) .
Under these transformations, the promise keeping constraint 6 becomes:
X
θ




1
π (θ) U (θ) + H (θ) + βW (θ) = W.
θ

and, the incentive constraints 7 become:
1
1
U (θ) + H (θ) + βW (θ) ≥ U (θ̂) + H(θ̂) + βW (θ̂) ∀θ, θ̂ ∈ Θ.
θ
θ
Thus, the promise keeping and incentive constraints are linear in the transformed variables.
Next, we will show that the value function in problem (P) is strictly convex. If we rewrite
the objective in terms of transformed variables we obtain:
X
θ




1
0
0
π (θ) C (θ) + aN (θ) − Y (θ) + V (N (θ) , W (θ)) =
R
X
 −1


π (θ) N u
N −η U (θ) + aN 0 (θ) + N h−1 N −η H (θ)
0

θ


1
0
0
−N + V (N (θ) , W (θ)) .
R
For this objective function to be strictly convex, it is necessary that the two function
N h−1 (N −η H) and N u−1 (N −η U ) be strictly convex functions. That is what we assume
from now on.
We can rewrite the transformed version of the problem (P) as:
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V (N, W ) =

X

max
0

U (θ),H(θ),N (θ),W 0 (θ)



π (θ) N u−1 N −η U (θ) + aN 0 (θ)

θ
−1

−N 1 − h

N

−η

H (θ)




1
0
0
+ V (N (θ) , W (θ))
R

(11)

subject to
X
θ


1
π (θ) U (θ) + H (θ) + βW (θ) = W.
θ


and,
1
1
U (θ) + H (θ) + βW (θ) ≥ U (θ̂) + H(θ̂) + βW (θ̂) ∀θ, θ̂ ∈ Θ.
θ
θ
We state and prove the main result of this section in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose that N h−1 (N −η H) and N u−1 (N −η U ) are strictly convex functions
of (N, H) and (N, U ) and that for some convex set A, and all (N, W ) ∈ A, there is a
solution to the sequence problem (3). Then, the solution to the functional equation (11) is
strictly convex on A and differentiable on the interior of A. Moreover, there is a function,
v : R → R, such that V (N, W ) = N v(N −η W ).
Proof. To show that V (·, ·) is strictly convex, we use the sequence problem version of the
recursive problem (11) and use the principle of optimality to show that V (·, ·) is convex.
Consider the following sequence problem

max

∞  t X
X
1

Ut ,Ht ,Nt+1 ,Wt+1

t=0

R

h


−η


π(θt ) Nt θt−1 u−1 Nt θt−1
Ut θt + aNt+1 θt

θt

−Nt θt−1




−η
i
1 − h−1 Nt θt−1
Ht θt

subject to
X
θt ≥θt−1

Ut (θt ) +

t

π(θ |θ

t−1



1
t
t
t
) Ut (θ ) + Ht (θ ) + βWt+1 (θ ) = Wt (θt−1 ),
θt

∀θt−1

1
1
Ht (θt ) + βWt+1 (θt ) ≥ Ut (θt−1 , θ̂t ) + Ht (θt−1 , θ̂t ) + βWt+1 (θt−1 , θ̂t ), ∀θt , θ̂t
θt
θt

given W0 = W, N0 = N
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By the principle of optimality, the value associated with the above problem is given
by V (N, W ). Now, consider two possible initial conditions (N 1 , W 1 ) 6= (N 2 , W 2 ). Associated with each of these is a set of allocations that solve the above maximization problem


2
2
1
1
(θt ) , re(θt ), Wt+1
(θt ) and Ut2 (θt ), Ht2 (θt ), Nt+1
(θt ), Wt+1
given by Ut1 (θt ), Ht1 (θt ), Nt+1
spectively. Let (Ñ , W̃ ) = λ(N 1 , W 1 ) + (1 − λ)(N 1 , W 2 ) and define the following allocations
Ũt (θt ) = λUt1 (θt ) + (1 − λ)Ut2 (θt ),
H̃t (θt ) = λHt1 (θt ) + (1 − λ)Ht2 (θt ),
2
1
(θt ),
(θt ) + (1 − λ)Nt+1
Ñt+1 (θt ) = λNt+1
1
2
W̃t+1 (θt ) = λWt+1
(θt ) + (1 − λ)Wt+1
(θt ).

Note that, since the constraint set is linear, the above allocation satisfies promise keeping and
incentive compatibility when the initial state is given by (Ñ , W̃ ). Let Ṽ denote the value of
objective function at the allocation constructed above. Then, we must have V (Ñ , W̃ ) ≤ Ṽ .
Note also that, since the objective function is convex
Ṽ ≤ λV (N 1 , W 1 ) + (1 − λ)V (N 2 , W 2 ).
Moreover, since the period cost functions, N h−1 (N −η H) and N u−1 (N −η U ), are strictly
convex, the above inequality is strict (provided that for some θt , either Ut1 (θt ) 6= Ut2 (θt ),
1
2
or Ht1 (θt ) 6= Ht2 (θt ), or Nt+1
(θt ) 6= Nt+1
(θt )). Hence, the function V (·, ·) must be strictly
convex. The same proof can be used to show that the optimal allocation is unique.
In order to show that the the value function is differentiable, we use a technique similar
to Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979). To do so, we also need to use results developed by
Milgrom and Segal (2002). From the argument above, we know that the value function is
strictly convex and the policy functions are unique. Now consider an interior point (N, W )

0
and let the optimal policy at this point be given by U ∗ (θ) , H ∗ (θ) , N ∗ (θ) , W 0∗ (θ) . For
any (Ñ , W̃ ) close to (N, W ), define the following function
X

G(Ñ , W̃ ) = max
H(θ),U (θ)




h

π (θ) Ñ − Ñ h−1 Ñ −η H (θ) − Ñ u−1 Ñ −η U (θ)

θ


1
0∗
0∗
−aN (θ) + V (N (θ) , W (θ))
R
0∗

subject to
X
θ



1
0∗
π (θ) U (θ) + H (θ) + βW (θ) = W̃
θ
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and

1
1
U (θ) + H (θ) + βW 0∗ (θ) ≥ U (θ̂) + H(θ̂) + βW 0∗ (θ̂) ∀θ, θ̂ ∈ Θ.
θ
θ

Note that since we have fixed future policies, we must have that G(Ñ , W̃ ) ≤ V (Ñ , W̃ ) with
equality at (N, W ) = (Ñ , W̃ ). Since the cost functions are strictly convex and the set of constraints are linear, the solution to the above maximization problem is unique. Moreover, by
the theorem of maximum the solution is continuous in (Ñ , W̃ ). Hence by applying Theorem
5 and Corollary 4 in Milgrom and Segal (2002), G(·, ·) is differentiable. Furthermore, since
the cost functions are strictly convex, we must have that G(·, ·) is strictly convex. Hence, by
Lemma 1 in Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) , V (·, ·) must be differentiable at (N, W ).
In order to show the final property of the value function, we show that the transformation
associated with the functional equation (11) preserves that property. That is, if T (·) is the
transformation associated with the functional equation (11) and the set S is defined as the
following:

S = V (N, W ); ∃v : R → R, V (N, W ) = N v(N −η W ) ,
then T (S) ⊆ S. Suppose that V ∈ S, then ∃v such that V (N, W ) = N v(N −η W ), and

T V (N, W ) =

X

max
0

H(θ),U (θ),N

(θ),W 0 (θ)




π (θ) N − N h−1 N −η H (θ) − N u−1 N −η U (θ)

θ


1
0
0
−aN (θ) + V (N (θ) , W (θ))
R
0

subject to
X
θ




1
π (θ) U (θ) + H (θ) + βW (θ) = W.
θ

and,
1
1
U (θ) + H (θ) + βW (θ) ≥ U (θ̂) + H(θ̂) + βW (θ̂) ∀θ, θ̂ ∈ Θ.
θ
θ
Now, let V̂ (N, N −η W ) = N −1 T V (N, W ) and define h (θ) = N −η H (θ), u (θ) = N −η U (θ),
n (θ) = N −1 N 0 (θ) and w0 (θ) = N (θ)−η W 0 (θ). Then the above maximization can be written
as
T V̂ (N, W ) =

max
0

H(θ),U (θ),N (θ),W 0 (θ)

N

X


π (θ) 1 − h−1 (h (θ)) − u−1 (u (θ))

θ


1
0
−an (θ) + n (θ) v(w (θ))
R
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subject to
X
θ


1
η 0
π (θ) u (θ) + h (θ) + βn (θ) w (θ) = N −η W.
θ


and,
1
1
u (θ) + h (θ) + βn (θ)η w0 (θ) ≥ u(θ̂) + h(θ̂) + βn(θ̂)η w0 (θ̂) ∀θ, θ̂ ∈ Θ.
θ
θ
Clearly, V̂ (N, N −η W ) is independent of N and solely depends on N −η W . Hence T V ∈ S.
From this proposition, it follows that the result of proposition (1) will hold as long as the
solution to the contracting problem is interior. In order to guarantee that this holds we will
make the the following standard assumptions12 :
Assumption 1 Period utility function satisfies the following:
1. u is unbounded below and negative and η < 0.
2. h is unbounded below and negative.
Under these conditions, the solution will be interior and thus, we have:
Corollary 1 Under assumptions (1):
1. The solution to problem (P’) has the property that w0 (θ, w) = w∗ for all θ and w.
Hence, there is a stationary distribution over continuation values (a point mass at
w∗ ).
2. The allocations n (θt ), c (θt ), and y (θt ) are i.i.d. and monotone increasing in current
shock θ.

3

Population Dynamics

In this section, we study the population dynamics that are implied by the optimal contract
discussed in the previous section. First, we show that aggregate population is a random
walk with drift. We show that under certain conditions it is possible to determine whether
the drift is downward – implying immiseration in population – or upward – implying no
immiseration in either population or per capita variables.
12

In addition to this assumption, we have made two extra assumptions on u and h in the statement of
Proposition 2. It can be checked that all of these assumptions are satisfied for the following specification:
1−σc
1−σl
u = c1−σc , h(`) = ψ `1−σl with 1 < σl , σc < 1 − η
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We provide two types of results. In the first, we show that in certain cases, Nt → 0 a.s., a
property we call ‘population immiseration’. In this case, although there is a non-degenerate
stationary distribution over per capita consumption, the overall size of the dynasty shrinks
over time and hence, Nt1−η (u(ct ) + h(yt , θt )) → −∞, a.s. Therefore, although the flow utility
for each individual is bounded below, the flow utility from the dynasty head’s perspective –
which is adjusted by population size – is shrinking almost surely. We show that this is true
whenever R is exogenously set to be less than or equal to the inverse of discount factor, i.e.,
βR ≤ 1.
However, the condition βR ≤ 1 is not typically an outcome in Barro-Becker type fertility
models when the return on capital, R, is endogenous. Indeed, if model parameters are chosen
so as to match empirical (and positive) population growth, it must be true that βR > 1. For
this reason, we go on to study the population dynamics of the model in the long run when
R is determined endogenously.
Our goal is to present sufficient conditions for no ‘population immiseration’ when R is
endogenous. To this end, we first study population dynamics when there is full information.
In this case we can fully characterize population dynamics in the long run. In particular, we
can determine the population growth rate. Under certain sufficient conditions the population
growth rate under full information can provide an appropriate upper (or lower) bound for
population growth rate in the private information model. We specify these conditions in
proposition 6 below.

3.1

An Inverse Euler Equation

To begin, we extend the results in Golosov et al. (2003) to our environment with endogenous
fertility and derive a version of Inverse Euler Equation. We summarize this as a Proposition:
Proposition 3 If, in the optimal contract, consumption is always interior, the optimal allocation satisfies a version of the Inverse Euler Equation:



E

1
Nt+1 (θt )η−1 u0
1

Hence, if βR ≤ 1,
Nt+1

(θt )η−1 u0



(θt+1 )

Ct+1
Nt+1 (θt )

Ct+1 (θ t+1 )
Nt+1 (θ t )



 |θt  =

βR
Nt (θt−1 )η−1 u0



Ct (θt )
Nt (θt−1 )

.

is a non-negative super-martingale.
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Ct (θt )
Proof. Let Ct (θt ) be Nt (θt−1 ) part of the efficient plan and let ct (θt ) ≡ Nt (θt−1 ) be per capita
consumption at history θt . Consider decreasing per capita consumption of each parent parent
with history θt and saving that unit. There will be R units available for next generation which
can be distributed among the descendants. We increase consumption of each descendant of
type θt+1 by (θt+1 ) such that:

Nt+1 (θt )

X

π(θt+1 )(θt+1 ) = Nt (θt−1 )R

θt+1
t η 0

Nt+1 (θ ) u (ct+1 (θt , θ))(θ) = Nt+1 (θt )η u0 (ct+1 (θt , θ0 ))(θ0 ) = ∆ for all θ, θ0 .
The first equation is the resource constraint implied by redistributing the available resources.
The second equation makes sure that the incentives are aligned by insuring that utility of
all descendants increase by the same increment regardless of their ability shock θt+1 . This
implies that the change in the utility of all types is the same – there is no incentive to lie.
The above equations imply that
X
θt+1

π(θt+1 )

∆
Nt+1

(θt )η−1 u0 (c

t
t+1 (θ , θt+1 ))

= Nt (θt−1 )R

Since the change in utility from this perturbation must be zero, we must have β∆ =
Nt (θt−1 )η u0 (ct (θt )). Replacing ∆ in the above equation implies the claim of the proposition.
This result must hold independent of the cost and shock structure as long as utility
function is separable between leisure and consumption (See Hosseini et al. (2009) for the
derivation in the case where cost of child rearing is in terms of parents time). When, βR ≤ 1,
1−η
we see from above that Xt = Nt+1 (θt ) /u0 (ct+1 (θt+1 )) is a non-negative super-martingale.
Thus, the martingale convergence theorem implies that there exists a non-negative random
variable with finite mean, X∞ , such that Xt → X∞ a.s. As is standard in this literature, to provide incentives for truthful revelation of types, we must have ‘spreading’ in
1−η
Nt+1 (θt ) /u0 (ct+1 (θt+1 )) as long as some incentive constraints are binding. Thomas and
Worrall (1990) have shown that in an environment where incentive constraints are always
binding, spreading leads to immiseration. Intuitively, the planner is relying heavily on overall
dynasty size to provide incentives and less on continuation utilities. This is something that
sets this model apart from the more standard approach with exogenous fertility.
We present the argument in the context of our model as the following corollary.
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Corollary 2 Assume only local downward constraints are binding. If βR ≤ 1, then Nt (θt−1 ) →
0 a.s.
1−η

Proof. It follows from the above that Nt (θt−1 ) /u0 (ct (θt )) is a non-negative supermartingale and therefore it has to converge almost surely to a non-negative random variable
X∞ . We will show that X∞ must be zero.
Consider the first order conditions in problem (P’) . First note that
n θt

1−η

v 0 w0 θt



=

u0

1
.
(ct (θt ))

Also, for the highest and lowest types (recall that we assume only local downward constraints
are binding)

n θt−1 , θ1



= βRλ + βR

µ (θI , θI−1 )
≥ βRλ
π (θt−1 , θI )



= βRλ − βR

µ (θ2 , θ1 )
≤ βRλ.
π (θt−1 , θ1 )

1−η

v 0 w0 θt−1 , θI

1−η

v 0 w0 θt−1 , θ1

n θt−1 , θI

Note that if either of the constraints (on θI or θ2 ) is binding we must have
n θt−1 , θI

1−η

v 0 w0 θt−1 , θI

Therefore
u0



> n θt−1 , θ1

1−η

v 0 w0 θt−1 , θ1



1
1
> 0
.
t−1
(ct (θ , θI ))
u (ct (θt−1 , θ1 ))

Multiplying both sides by Nt (θt−1 )

η−1

, we get
1−η

1−η

Nt (θt−1 )
Nt (θt−1 )
>
.
u0 (ct (θt−1 , θI ))
u0 (ct (θt−1 , θ1 ))
Note that when the cost of child rearing is only in terms of consumption goods ct (θt )
is i.i.d. and hence, does note converge to any limit. Therefore, the only possibility for
1−η
Nt (θt−1 ) /u0 (ct (θt )) to converge to a finite non-negative number is Nt (θt−1 ) → 0 a.s.
The fact that Nt+1 (θt ) → 0 a.s. does not mean that fertility converges to zero almost
surely, rather, it means that it is less than replacement (for example, nt (θt ) < 1 most of
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the time). In fact, Nt+1 (θt ) → 0 a.s. does not even imply that E(Nt+1 (θt )) → 0. In computed examples, it can be shown that for certain parameter configurations (with βR = 1),
E(Nt+1 (θt )) → ∞ even though Nt+1 (θt ) → 0 a.s.. The reason for this apparent contradiction is that Nt is not bounded – it converges to zero on some sample paths and to ∞ on others.
When βR > 1, the situation is more complicated. Even though a stationary distribution
over per capita variables still exists, it need not follow that Nt+1 (θt ) → 0 a.s. In fact,
numerical examples can be constructed in which Nt+1 (θt ) → ∞ a.s. (see Hosseini et al.
(2010b) and the discussion below where R is endogenous). However, it can be shown that
almost every path converges to zero relative to a trend. In some sense, there is always
population immiseration ‘relative to a trend’. The next proposition is a formal statement
Nt1−η 0
and proof of this. To see this note that Xt = (βR)
t v (wt ) is always a non-negative martingale.
Proposition 4 If βR > 1 and cost of child rearing is only in terms of consumption goods,
Nt (θt+1 )
→ 0 a.s.
then
t
(βR) 1−η

Proof. Consider the inverse Euler equation



1
βR
t
E
|θ
.
=
Nt+1 (θt )η−1 u0 (ct+1 (θt+1 ))
Nt (θt−1 )η−1 u0 (ct (θt ))
and recall that when the cost of child rearing is only in terms of consumption goods, ct (θt )
is i.i.d. Therefore taking expectations over θt we will have
 



1
βR
1
1
t−1
t−1
t−1
|θ
E 0
|θ
=
E 0
|θ
,
E
Nt+1 (θt )η−1
u (ct+1 (θt+1 ))
Nt (θt−1 )η−1
u (ct (θt ))


and hence


E Nt+1 (θt )1−η |θt−1 = βRNt (θt−1 )1−η .

(12)

Dividing both sides by (βR)t we get

Nt+1 (θt )1−η t−1
Nt (θt−1 )1−η
E
|θ
=
.
(βR)t
(βR)t−1


t 1−η

(θ )
Therefore, Xt = Nt+1(βR)
is non-negative martingale and by the Martingale Convergence
t
Theorem there exists a non-negative random variable with finite mean, X∞ , such that Xt →
X∞ a.s. To establish the claim of the proposition we need to show that X∞ = 0. Note that
equation (12) implies


E n (θ)1−η = βR.
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By Jensen’s inequality




E log n (θ)1−η < log E n (θ)1−η = log (βR) .
Recall that nt (θt ) is i.i.d and we can apply the Law of Large Numbers to show that






t 1−η




− t log (βR)


lim log (Xt ) = lim log Nt+1 θ
t→∞


 Pt
i 1−η
log
n
(θ
)
i
i=0
− log (βR)
= lim t 
t→∞
t



= lim t E log n (θ)1−η − log (βR)

t→∞

t→∞

= −∞.
This implies that X∞ has to be zero.
The discussion above indicates the importance of R in determining the limiting behavior
of overall population size as well as population of each dynasty. Next, we study the case in
which R is endogenously determined in the model.

3.2

Population Growth Rate with Endogenous Return on Capital

As we can see from the previous discussion, whether or not there is immiseration in population depends, in part, on whether βR is larger or smaller than unity. In this section, we
consider a more general version of the model in which R is determined endogenously through
general equilibrium effects. To simplify the analysis, we focus on the case where the cost
of children is in terms of the consumption good and individual types are taste shocks to
parent’s leisure. We also make a specific simplifying assumption about the utility function
over consumption and leisure and its curvature.
We show that whether or not there is population immiseration in depends on two factors.
The first has nothing to do with private information and can be summarized by the return
on capital in full information economy, which we refer to as RF I . In the economy with full
information, fertility, n (θ), is the same across all realizations of θ and therefore, the growth
rate of population is directly connected to the value of βRF I . For different parameter configurations, any of the three possibilities: i) βRF I < 1; ii) βRF I = 1; or iii) βRF I > 1 may
arise under full information. In the first case, Nt → 0, in the second case Nt is constant and
in the third case, Nt → ∞.
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In the case where uncertainty is in the form of a taste shock to leisure we can show that
return on capital in the private information economy, RP I is equal the return on capital
in the full information economy. However, in this case fertility depends on the realization
of θ for each parent. The inverse Euler equation establishes a connection between average
of n (θ)1−η over realizations of θ and the value of βRP I . The second factor affecting the
growth rate of population shows up here. This is the curvature of the utility function. Using Jensen’s inequality in the Inverse Euler equation, it follows that increases in uncertainty
(or increase in curvature) causes mean growth rates to fall when η < 0 and rise when η > 0.13
Whether population grows or shrinks in the economy with private information depends
on the interplay of these two factors: return on capital and the degree of uncertainty in θ.
Our goal in this section is to identify conditions under which we can determine the overall
effect. We start by studying the problem with full information and develop, in special cases,
expressions for RF I based on the parameters of the model. We go on to re-introduce private
information and study the extent to which the interplay of return on capital and the degree
of uncertainty in θ can be sorted out.
3.2.1

The full information economy with endogenous R

Here, we extend the model discussed above to allow for the endogenous determination of
the interest rate. We assume that capital fully depreciates in each period and that the
production function is given by:
F (Kt , Lt ) = AKtα Lt1−α
P
where Lt = θt π(θt )Yt (θt ) is the aggregate quantity of efficiency units of labor provided by
households in period t. In this environment, the sequence planning problem is given by:14
max

∞
X
t=0

β

t

X
θt

t

π(θ )Nt (θ




 
1
Yt (θt )
Ct (θt )
+ h
) u
Nt (θt−1 )
θt
Nt (θt−1 )

t−1 η

subject to
X

X


π(θt ) Ct (θt ) + aNt+1 (θt ) + Kt+1 ≤ F (Kt ,
π(θt )Yt (θt ))

θt

θt

13

This is the opposite of the usual effect of uncertainty on growth rates because it is coming from the
Inverse Euler Equation rather than the Euler Equation (See Jones et al. (2005)).
14
We are writing this problem as utility maximization problem rather than cost minimization problem for
simplicity. It is easy to show that the full information economy has nice properties that make these two
problems identical.
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To simplify the problem, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 Utility over consumption and leisure are CRRA and have the same curvature:
c1−σ
φ (1 − y)1−σ
u(c) =
and h(y, θ) =
,
1−σ
θ 1−σ
and η = 1 − σ
These assumptions will simplify the algebra below. Hence, period utility is simplified to:
"

X
θt

1−σ

C(θt )t1−σ
1 (Nt (θt ) − Yt (θt ))
π(θ )
+ φ
1−σ
θt
1−σ
t

#
.

From above, it can be seen that this model can be interpreted as a model with two types
P
of capital, θt−1 π (θt−1 ) Nt (θt−1 ) and Kt , i.e., aggregate population and physical capital.
Since there are no frictions, the planner will be indifferent between investment in population
and investment in physical capital. That is, there should not be any arbitrage opportunity
between physical capital and population.15 The return to physical capital is simply given by
FK (Kt+1 , Lt+1 ). At the optimum, the planner should be indifferent between investment in
physical capital and investment in any dynasty’s population. A unit increase in population,
Nt+1 (θt ), costs the planner a units of consumption good at date t, and has the benefit
of increasing household’s utility from leisure in the future. Since households labor supply
decisions are not distorted, the marginal utility of leisure in terms of consumption goods
is simply given by FL (Kt+1 , Lt+1 ). Hence, the return to investing in children is given by
FL (Kt+1 , Lt+1 ) /a. Therefore, no arbitrage implies that
FK (Kt+1 , Lt+1 ) =

FL (Kt+1 , Lt+1 )
.
a

Using the Cobb-Douglas formulation for F , we have
1 − α Kt+1
= a.
α Lt+1
Hence, the return on capital is given by

RF I = αA
15

Lt+1
Kt+1

1−α


= αA

1−α
aα

1−α

See Jones and Schoonbroodt (2010) for a more detailed study of this model with a representative agent.
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With full information, the Euler equation holds and hence, the population growth rate on
the balanced growth path (where consumption, total hours worked, as well as capital stock
all grow at the rate of population growth), γF I satisfies:
βRF I γFη−1
I = 1.
Thus,
1

γF I = (βRF I ) 1−η .
Note that from above argument, on the balanced growth path, the capital–labor ratio is
constant and independent of time. Hence, we can solve for population growth rate in terms
of primitives:
"
γF I =

β αA



1−α
aα

1
1−α #! 1−η

.

From this, we can see that population will be growing whenever the technology is sufficiently productive (i.e., A is large) or children are cheap enough (i.e., a is small) or the
representative parent is sufficiently patient (i.e., β is close to 1).
3.2.2

The private information economy with endogenous R

We now turn to the problem of characterizing the optimal contract with private information
and an endogenous R. Ideally, we would like to characterize the limiting properties of Nt
when R is endogenous to match up with the discussion in section 3.1. This turns out to
be difficult however. Because of this, we will focus on mean population growth rates instead. Accordingly, in this section, we discuss conditions when mean population is growing
or shrinking.
To do this, we begin by characterizing the solution to the problem of a representative
insurance firm taking rental rate of capital, RP I = FK , and wage, pP I = FL , as given (the
subscript refers private information economy). The solution to this problem will give rise
to aggregate quantities of capital, Kt and labor supply, Lt . At the optimum, on a balanced
growth path, it must be true that the resulting shadow prices for capital and labor are constant over time and satisfy Rt = FK (Kt , Lt ) = RP I and pt = FL (Kt , Lt ) = pP I . Finally,
it must also be true that W0 (promised utility to the head of the dynasty) is such that
V0 (N0 , W0 ) = r0 K0 – zero profits for the typical insurance company.
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Consider the problem of cost minimization of the insurance firm taking FK = RP I , fixed
and FL = pP I fixed (assuming that η = 1 − σ) with private information:
V (N, W ) =

X

max

C(θ),Y (θ),N 0 (θ),W 0 (θ)

θ



1
0
0
0
π (θ) C (θ) + aN (θ) − pP I Y (θ) +
V (N (θ) , W (θ))
RP I
(13)

subject to
#
C (θ)1−σ 1 (N − Y (θ))1−σ
+ φ
+ βW (θ) = W
π (θ)
1−σ
θ
1−σ
"

X
θ

and
1−σ



1−σ

1 (N − Y (θ))
C (θ)
+ φ
1−σ
θ
1−σ

1−σ

+βW (θ) ≥

C(θ̂)
1
+ φ
1−σ
θ

1−σ
N − Y (θ̂)
1−σ

+βW (θ̂), ∀θ, θ̂ ∈ Θ.

As in the case in the full information economy, the solution to this problem will satisfy
a no-arbitrage condition. This condition can be characterized by focusing on the first order
condition with respect to N 0 (θ) in the above problem and the Envelope condition with
respect to N . These two conditions are given by
1
VN (N 0 (θ) , W 0 (θ)) = a
RP I

(14)

1
π (θ) φ (N − Y (θ))−σ
(15)
θ
θ

−σ 
X  1 
−σ
+
µ θ, θ̂ φ (N (θ) − Y (θ)) − N − Y (θ̂)
(16)
θ

VN (N, W ) = λ

X

θ,θ̂,θ̂6=θ

The first equation is first order condition with respect to N 0 (θ). The second equation is the
Envelope condition with respect to N , where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the promise
keeping constraint and µ(θ, θ̂) is the Lagrange multiplier on the incentive constraint. Next,
we show that the right hand side of the Envelope condition must be equal to pP I (the
efficiency wage rate in the private information economy). To see this, notice that the first
order condition with respect to Y (θ) is given by







1 X
1 X
1
π (θ) p = φ (N − Y (θ))−σ π (θ) λ +
µ θ, θ̂
−
µ θ̂, θ 
θ
θ
θ̂
θ̂6=θ
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θ6=θ̂

A summation of the above equations over all θ implies that the right hand side of (15) must
be equal to p. Hence, on a balanced growth path, VN (N, W ) = pP I .
It follows from this discussion that pPa I = RP I . We showed in the previous section that
a similar equality holds in full information economy – pFa I = RF I . Thus, it must be the case
FI
PI
that RpFFII = RpPPII = FFKL (K,L)
. It follows that the capital–labor ratios K
and K
in both
(K,L)
LF I
LP I
economy must be equal. Therefore, the return on capital in both economies must be equal,
i.e., RF I = RP I . We summarize this discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Suppose the source of heterogeneity is a shock to the taste for leisure and
assumption 2 holds. Then, the return to capital in both full information and private information economy are equal, i.e., RF I = RP I .
As the above analysis shows, introducing private information in the taste shock model
does not affect the balanced growth path capital–labor ratio. To see the intuition for this
result, consider an infinitesimal increase in family size at date t. The benefit of this increase
comes from the increase in utility of the parents from their children’s leisure. The consumption equivalent (at date t+1) of this increase in welfare is given by −pP It+1 Et [M RSYt+1 ,Nt+1 ],
where M RSY,N is the marginal rate of substitution between income Y and family size N .
The cost this increase in family size is given by aRP It+1 in terms of consumption goods lost
(also at date t + 1). Hence, we must have
−pP It+1 Et [M RSYt+1 ,Nt+1 ] = aRP It+1 .
Notice that in the model with a taste shock, the marginal rate of substitution between Yt+1
and Nt+1 is equal to −1. This is true independent of whether there is private information
or full information, since in (13), N and Y (θ) always appear together. In the model with
productivity shocks however, this is not necessarily true. When there is no friction, the above
no arbitrage condition implies that the capital–labor ratio is the same as the one with the
taste shock model (since M RSY,N = θ). In the presence of private information, however, this
marginal rate of substitution changes and it is affected by how tight the incentive constraints
are as well as the ratio of the productivities.
We can now turn to studying the properties of population dynamics when private information is present. First, recall our version of the Inverse Euler Equation:

Et


βRP I
1
= 1−η
.
0
u (ct+1 )
nt u0 (ct )
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Since the θt are i.i.d., and we have ‘resetting property’ (i.e., per capita promised utility
to each chile is w∗ and allocations are i.i.d), it follows that u0 (c1t+1 ) are also i.i.d.. Thus,
h
i
h
i
Et u0 (c1t+1 ) = E u0 (c1t+1 ) – the left hand side of this equation doesn’t depend on t. Hence,
the same must be true of the right hand side. It follows that nt1−η u0 (ct ) ≡ B is independent
η−1
of t. Substituting u0 (ct+1 ) = Bnt+1
we have:
 1−η 
= βRP I .
E nt+1

Next, using our assumption that η = 1 − σ, it follows that when σ > 1, η < 0 (i.e., n1−η
is convex). Hence, in this case, Jensen’s Inequality implies:


1−η
βRP I = E n1−η
= γP1−η
t+1 > [E(nt+1 )]
I .
Similarly, when σ < 1, 0 < η < 1 and so n1−η is concave. In this case:


1−η
βRP I = E n1−η
= γP1−η
t+1 < [E(nt+1 )]
I .
As shown above, with full information, we have the property βRF I = γF1−η
I in all cases. Also,
as we have shown in proposition 5 RP I = RP I . Using these facts, we obtain:
Proposition 6 In the case with a goods cost and taste shocks:
1. If σ = 1 − η < 1, then γP I ≥ γF I with equality only if n is degenerate. Thus, in this
case, if γF I > 1, there is no ‘population immiseration;’
2. If σ = 1 − η > 1, then γP I ≤ γF I with equality only if n is degenerate. In this case, if
γF I < 1, there is ‘population immiseration;’
3. If σ = 1 − η > 1, and γF I > 1 whether γP I >< 1 depends on the distribution of θ. If
the amount of uncertainty is small enough, γP I > 1.
Remark 1: the no ‘population immiseration’ results in this proposition refer to immiseration in an absolute sense. As we saw in proposition 4 whenever βR > 1 there is immiseration
in population relative to the trend (βR)t/(1−η) .
Remark 2: As noted above, although γP I >< 1 is related to the asymptotic properties of
Nt (i.e., → ∞, 0 a.s.), they are not identical. (since Nt is a geometric random walk with
drift, the asymptotic behavior of Nt is governed by E (log(n)) not E(n).)
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From this, we can see that population grows on average as long as γF I > 1, i.e., as long as
there population growth under full information, provided that either σ < 1, or uncertainty
is not too large (this is essentially a continuity argument).
Remark 3: When the shock is to productivity (as opposed to taste for leisure), the relationship becomes even more complex because it is no longer true that RF I = RP I . It can be
shown that with productivity shocks, we still have


−pP It+1 Et M RSYt+1 ,Nt+1 = aRP It+1 .
However, contrary to the case with taste shocks, we have −M RSYt+1 ,Nt+1 > 1. This implies
that the capital labor ratio has to be lower with private information and therefore, RF I >
RP I . Thus, in this case, it is even more difficult to obtain any concrete results. Of course,
if population is growing under full info (γF I > 1) and uncertainty is not too large, the
continuity argument behind proposition 6 will still hold, but it is difficult to say much more
analytically.

3.3

Numerical Example

In this section we present a numerical example. Our goal is to show that for reasonable
parameter values it is possible to have population growth in the model (not all dynasties
vanish). Thus, there is no immiseration either in per capita terms, or in population. In
our example the size of all dynasties grow (regardless of their shock history). To prove the
propositions in the previous section we made the restrictive assumption that the private
types of parents are taste shock to leisure. In the numerical example we are not constrained
by this. Thus, in the example we use the more realistic setting in which the types are
productivity shocks. We continue to assume the period utility function is
1−σ
1 − yθ
c1−σ
+φ
u (c, y; θ) =
1−σ
1−σ
where y is efficiency units of labor service and thus,
function is of the standard Cobb-Douglas form:

y
θ

is hours worked. We assume production

F (K, L) = AK α L1−α + (1 − δ) K
where δ is the depreciation rate.
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Figure 1: Panel (a) Population growth under full information (sold line) and private information (dashed line). Panel (b) Fertility for high (red) and low (blue) productivity shocks.
Following Jones and Schoonbroodt (2010) we choose β = 0.9620 , σ = 3, η = 1 − σ,
α = 0.33 and δ = 1 − (1 − 0.088)20 . We pick A = 2 and then choose φ = 0.5, and a = 1.1
such that the Frisch Elasticity of labor supply is 0.5 (with parents working on average 40% of
their time). Finally, for simplicity, we assume that there are only two shocks, θL < θH . We
assume that π(θL ) = π(θH ) = 0.5. We choose the values for θL and θH so that we match the
variance of log-income in the U.S., at 0.6, in the private information version of the model.
For this, we use θL = 5 and θH = 15. For these parameter values, the annual population
growth is 1.11% per year in the private information model, close to the actual rate of growth
in the U.S. (The growth rate is 1.13% per year under full information).
The results of this exercise are contained in Figure 1. In panel (a) we plot the annualized
population growth for different values of the curvature parameter (risk aversion, σ). As we
see, for this range of parameters population always grows under both full and and private
information. In panel (b), we plot fertility for parents who receive a low shock (blue line) and
those who received a high shock (red line). We see that for all values of the utility parameter
fertilities are higher than one. Thus, fertility is higher than replacement (i.e., higher than
n = 1.0), meaning that regardless of history of shocks, all dynasties grow in size.

4

Time Costs of Kids

In this section, we consider a variant of the model presented in the previous sections by
assuming that the cost of children is primarily in terms of the time of parents. This version
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of the problem, though more realistic in some ways, does create some technical difficulties.
The first of these is that there is no simple transformation of the problem, even in the taste
shock case, which makes the contracting problem convex. Because of this, we will need to
make assumptions directly on binding incentive constraints (which are binding and which
are slack at the solution) as well as convexity and differentiability of value functions.
The second difficulty comes about because the version of the ‘resetting equation’ that we
derive only holds in certain circumstances – always for the highest (undistorted) type, and
for low enough continuation values for other types. The resetting property at the top has
important implications about intergenerational social mobility. In fact, it makes sure that
any productive parent will have children with a high level of wealth (if we consider promised
utility as a proxy for wealth).
The fact that only a limited version of resetting holds here has two other important
implications. First, it implies that the stationary distribution over continuation values is no
longer degenerate. Second, we also lose a result from the previous sections: the per capita
allocations are i.i.d.. Thus, what we take away is that in more complicated and realistic
versions of the model, there is still a stationary distribution over the key variables, but their
dynamics are more complicated than suggested by the goods cost case.

4.1

The Contracting Problem

Consider the model studied in section 2 (that is with a fixed, exogenous, return on capital).
We focus on the version of the problem in which θ0 s are productivity shocks and we add the
assumption that each child that is born requires b units of time from the parent as well as
a units of the consumption good. It follows that the relevant amount of leisure per parent
t
is given by 1 − ytθ(θt ) − bnt (θt ). Thus, the contracting problem in its recursive form is given
by:16
v(w) =

min

{c(θ),y(θ),n(θ),w0 (θ)}∞
t=0

s.t.
X
θ

X
θ




1
0
π(θ) c(θ) + an(θ) − y(θ) + n(θ)v(w (θ))
R

(Pt)





y(θ)
η 0
π(θ) u (c(θ)) + h 1 −
− bn(θ) + βn(θ) w (θ) = w
θ

16

The reduction of the problem from aggregate to per capita and its recursive formulation is identical to
the goods cost case. So we omit that step.
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y(θ)
u (c(θ)) + h 1 −
− bn(θ) + βn(θ)η w0 (θ) ≥
θ
!


y(θ̂)
− bn(θ̂) + βn(θ̂)η w0 (θ̂) ∀ θ̂ ≤ θ
u c(θ̂) + h 1 −
θ

For technical reasons, we will assume that only downward incentive constraints are binding.
Including a time cost in the model, introduces further complications. In particular, it
is possible for some types never to work. This happens when it is more efficient for an
individual to produce goods through an indirect method of having children with the children
. We will rule out this situation by making
working in the future. This will hold when θ < Eθ
bR
the following assumption:
Assumption 3 Assume that for all θ ∈ Θ, θ >

E[θ]
.
bR

Note that this assumption does not guarantee that hours are always positive. The fact
that fertility enters leisure implies that Inada condition on hours will be never be satisfied and
therefore, it might be optimal for an agent with a very low marginal utility from consumption
not to work. However, when marginal utility from consumption is high enough, it is optimal
for an agent to work.

4.2

The Resetting Property

We have shown that children’s utility is independent of parent’s promised utility when the
cost of children is in terms of goods. In this section, we show that this result extends to
the time cost version of the model, but only for the highest type, i.e., θ = θI . This can be
derived from the first order conditions of the recursive formulation.
The analogue of the resetting equation for this version of the model is:
v (w0 (θI , w)) + bRθI + aR = ηw0 (θI , w) v 0 (w0 (θI , w)) .

(17)

Note that that this equation is very similar to equation (10). The only added term is bRθI ,
which is the value of time used by the highest type to raise a child in terms of future consumption good.
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In equation (17), w0 (θI , w) is the par capita promised utility to child of a parent who
has current promised utility of w and has received the highest productivity shock, θI . Using
the same argument as before, we can see that w0 (θI , w) is independent of promised utility to
the parent, w. That is, w0 (θI , w) = w0 (θI , ŵ) for all w, ŵ. We denote this level of promised
utility by wI = w0 (θI , w).
The resetting property, in this environment, means that once a parent receives the highest
productivity shock, the per capita allocation for her descendants is independent of the parents
level of wealth – an extreme version of social mobility holds. We summarize this in a
proposition.17
Proposition 7 Assume that v is continuously differentiable and that there is a unique solution to (17). Then, there exists a wI such that the continuation utility for the parent who
receives the highest shock has the ‘resetting’ property, w0 (θI , w) = wI for all w.
Intuitively, the reason that the resetting property holds here mirrors the argument given
above in the goods cost case. That is, since no ‘type’ wants to pretend to have θ = θI , the
allocation for this type is marginally undistorted. Again, due to the homogeneity properties
of the problem, per capita variables (i.e., continuation utility) are independent of promised
utility.
Because of this, it follows that there is no immiseration in this model, under very mild
assumptions, in the sense that per capita utility does not converge to its lower bound. To
see this, first consider the situation when n (θ, w) is independent of (θ, w). In this case, from
any initial position, the fraction of the population that will be assigned to w0 next period is
at least π(θI ). This, by itself, implies that there is no a.s. convergence to the lower bound
of continuation utilities. When n (θ, w) is not constant, the argument involves more steps.
Assume that n (θ, w) is bounded above and below – 0 < n ≤ n(w, θ) ≤ n̄. Then, the fraction
π(θI )n
of descendants being assigned to w0 next period is at least (1−π(θ
. Again then, we see
I ))n̄
that there will not be a.s. immiseration. Thus, the key property that must be shown is that
0 < n ≤ n(w, θ) ≤ n̄.
To show this, we show that a version of the resetting property holds when continuation
utility is low enough for any type. That is, even as promised utility, w, gets lower and
lower, continuation utility, w0 (θ, w), is bounded below. From this, it follows that n (θ, w)
is bounded below in the relevant range of continuation utilities. (That this bound can’t be
17

For a detailed derivation and proof of this proposition see Hosseini et al. (2009)
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zero follows from promise keeping.)
To this end, we show that as w → −∞, the optimal allocation converges to c (θ, w) = 0,
l (θ, w) = 1, n (θ, w) = 0. None of the incentive constraints are binding at this allocation
and hence, the optimal allocation has properties similar to those that hold for the highest
type. Formally:
Proposition 8 Suppose that V is continuously differentiable and strictly convex. Then there
exists a wi ∈ R, such that
lim w0 (w, θi ) = wi
w→−∞

Proof. See Appendix B.1.
A key step in the proof is to show that when promised utility is sufficiently low, distortions, as measured by the values of the multipliers on the incentive constraints, converge to
zero. An important part of the proof uses the fact that utility of leisure, h (·), is unbounded
below. From this, it follows that as long as w0 (θ, w) is continuous, w0 will be bounded below
on any closed set bounded away from 0.
From Proposition 8, it follows that as long as w0 (w, θ) is continuous, w0 will be bounded
below on any closed set bounded away from 0 or we have the following corollary:
Corollary 3 Suppose that v is continuously differentiable and that ηwv 0 (w)−v(w) is strictly
decreasing. Then for all ŵ < 0, w0 (w, θ) is bounded below on (−∞, ŵ] there is a w(ŵ) such
that w0 (w, θ) ≥ w(ŵ) for all w ≤ ŵ and all θ.

4.3

Stationary Distributions

The results from the previous section effectively rule out a.s. immiseration as long as fertility,
n, is bounded away from 0. This, however, is not quite enough to show that a stationary
distribution exists. This is the topic of this section. There are two issues here. First, is there
a stationary distribution for continuation utilities and is it non-trivial? Second, because the
size of population is endogenous here, it could be growing, or shrinking, in a non-stationary
way. Hence, we must also show that the growth rate of population is constant. We deal with
this problem in general here.
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Consider a measure of continuation utilities over R, Ψ. Then, applying the policy functions to the measure Ψ, gives rise to a new measure over continuation utilities, T Ψ:
T (Ψ)(A) =

ˆ X
w

π(θ)1{(θ,w);w0 (θ,w)∈A} (w, θ)n(θ, w)dΨ(w)

(18)

θ

∀A : Borel Set in R
For a given measure over promised values today, Ψ, T (Ψ)(A) is the measure of agents with
continuation utility in the set A tomorrow. The overall population growth rate generated
by Ψ is given by:
´ P
γ(Ψ) =

R

θ

π(θ)n(θ, w)dΨ(w)
T (Ψ)(R)
=
.
Ψ(R)
Ψ(R)

Now, suppose Ψ is a probability measure over continuation utilities. Ψ is said to be a
stationary distribution if:
T (Ψ) = γ(Ψ) · Ψ.
This is equivalent to having a constant distribution of per capita continuation utility along
a balanced growth path in which population grows at rate (γ(Ψ)−1)×100 percent per period.
(Ψ)
To show that there is a stationary distribution, we will show that the mapping Ψ → Tγ(Ψ)
is a well-defined and continuous function on the set of probability measures on a compact
set of possible continuation utilities. To do this, we need to construct a compact set of
continuation utilities, [w, w], such that:

1. For all w ∈ [w, w], there is a solution to problem Pt;
2. For all w ∈ [w, w], w0 (w, θ) ∈ [w, w];
3. n(w, θ) and w0 (w, θ) are continuous functions of w on [w, w];
4. γ(Ψ) is bounded away from zero for the probabilities on [w, w].
The construction of the interval [w, w], is relegated to the Appendix.
Now, we are ready to prove our main result about the existence of a stationary distribution. Let M ([w, w]) be the set of regular probability measures on [w, w̄].
Theorem 1 Assume that for all w ∈ [w, w], there is a solution to the functional equation and
that it is unique. Then there exists a measure Ψ∗ ∈ M ([w, w̄]) such that T (Ψ∗ ) = γ(Ψ∗ ) · Ψ∗ .
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Proof. See Appendix B.2.
This theorem immediately implies that there is a stationary distribution for per capita
consumption, labor supply and fertility. Moreover, since promised utility is fluctuating in a
bounded set, per capita consumption has the same property. This shows that there is no
immiseration in per capita variables. However, since full resetting does not hold, it follows
that per capita allocations will not be i.i.d. in general.

5

Conclusion

In this paper, we have provided results concerning the form of the optimal contract in a
dynamic setting with dynastic altruism and fertility choice. We show that in this case the
optimal dynamic contract no longer features in immiseration in consumption under a wide
variety of assumptions about the costs of children and the nature of private information.
Indeed, with Barro–Becker style preferences, goods costs for children and i.i.d. shocks, we
have shown that there is a unique continuation value for children. Because of this feature,
it follows that consumption, labor supply and fertility are i.i.d.
We have gone on to show that there may or may not be immiseration in dynasty size,
depending on the specifics of the problem. Examples are given where each is shown to hold.
The model can also be used to study the form of the optimal subsidies to family size
and the efficient provision of incentives for bequests and how these two interact with labor
income taxes. Some preliminary work has been done along these lines (see (Hosseini et al.,
2010a)), but more work needs to be done.
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Appendix
A

Relationship between v (w) and V (N, W )

Lemma 2 Assume that V (·, ·) is twice differentiable. Then v(w) is convex and strictly
increasing and v(w) − ηwv 0 (w) is increasing.
Proof. We know from above that V (N, W ) = N v(N −η W ). Strict concavity of V (N, W )
implies that VW W > 0, VN N > 0, VW W VN N > VW2 N . We have
VW W = N 1−2η v 00 (N −η W ) = N 1−2η v 00 (w)
VW N = (1 − η)N −η v 0 (N −η W ) − ηN −2η W v 00 (N −η W ) = N −η ((1 − η)v 0 (w) − ηwv 00 (w))
VN N = η(η − 1)N −η−1 W v 0 (N −η W ) + η 2 N −2η−1 W 2 v 00 (N −η W )
= ηN −1 w ((η − 1)v 0 (w) + ηwv 00 (w))
After some algebra, we have
VW W VN N − VW2 N = N −2η ((η − 1)v 0 (w) + ηwv 00 (w)) (1 − η)v 0 (w)
Therefore, the strict convexity of V (·, ·) implies that:
v 00 (w) > 0
(η − 1)v 0 (w) + ηwv 00 (w) =
v 0 (w) > 0

B
B.1

d
(ηwv 0 (w) − v(w)) > 0
dw

Main Proofs
Proof of Proposition 8

We first prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3 Suppose that the value function in Pt is differentiable and 3 hold, then the value
function and the policy functions satisfy the following properties:

41

lim v(w) = −

w→−∞

X

π (θi ) θi

θi

lim c(θi , w) = 0

w→−∞

lim n(θi , w) = 0

w→−∞

lim l(θi , w) = 1

w→−∞

Proof. Consider the following set of function:




X
S = v̂; v̂ ∈ C(R− ), : v̂: weakly increasing : lim v̂(w) = −
π (θi ) θi
w→−∞


θi

Moreover define the following mapping on S as
T v̂(w) = min

X
θi




1
0
π (θi ) c (θi ) − θl (θi ) + n (θi ) v̂ (w (θi ))
R

s.t.
X

π (θi ) [u (c (θi )) + h (1 − l (θi ) − bn (θi )) + βn (θi )η w0 (θi )] ≥ w

θi



θj l (θj )
u (c (θi )) + h (1 − l (θi ) − bn (θi )) + βn (θi ) w (θi ) ≥ u (c (θj )) + h 1 −
− bn (θj )
θi
η

0

+ βn (θj )η w0 (θj ) , ∀i > j

l (θi ) + bn (θi ) ≤ 1
c (θi ) , l (θi ) , n (θi ) ≥ 0
We first show that the solution to the above program has the claimed property for the policy
function and that T v̂ satisfies the claimed property. Then, since S is closed and T preserves
S, by Contraction Mapping Theorem we have that the fixed point of T belongs to S.
Now, suppose the claim about policy function for fertility, does not hold. Then there
exists a sequence wn → −∞ such that for some θi , n(wn , θi ) → n̄i > 0. For each j =
6 i,
define n̄j = lim inf n→∞ n(wn , θj ), then we must have
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lim inf T v̂(wn ) ≥
n→∞

X
θj



1  X
π (θj ) [−θj (1 − bn̄j ) + n̄j −
π (θk ) θk 
R
θk

Note that by Assumption 3, we have
bθj >

1X
π (θk ) θk
R θ

∀j

k

and therefore, if n̄j ≥ 0, we must have
−θj + bn̄j θj −

1 X
n̄j
π (θk ) θk ≥ −θj
R
θ
k

with equality only if n̄j = 0. This implies that
lim inf T v̂(wn ) > −
n→∞

X

π (θj )

θj

since n̄i > 0. Now, we construct a sequence of allocation and show that the above allocation
cannot be an optimal. Consider a sequence of numbers m that converges to zero. Define

cm (θi ) = u−1 (−ηm )
1

nm (θi ) = (I − i) η m
0
wm
(θi ) = w̃ < 0

If h (·) is bounded above and below, define
lm (θi ) = 1 − m − bnm (θi )
By construction,
cm (θi ) → 0
nm (θi ) → 0
lm (θi ) → 1
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Moreover,
0
0
(θi ) = β w̃ηm (i − j), : ∀j > i
(θj ) − u(cm (θi )) − βnm (θi )η wm
u(cm (θj )) + βnm (θj )η wm

This expression converges to ∞ and therefore, since h (·) is bounded above and below for m
large enough, the allocations are incentive compatible.
When, h is unbounded below, since the utility of deviation is bounded away from −∞,
it is possible to construct a sequence for lm that converges to 1. Find lm (θi ) such that
1
h(1 − lm (θi ) − bnm (θi )) = w̃ηm
2
Hence, we have that
0
u(cm (θj )) + h(1 − lm (θj ) − bnm (θj )) + βnm (θj )η wm
(θj )

1
0
−u(cm (θi )) − βnm (θi )η wm
(θi ) = w̃ηm (i − j + )
2
converges to ∞. Moreover, by definition lm (θi ) converges to 1 and nm (θi ) converges to zero
and therefore the deviation value for leisure, h(1 − θi lmθj(θi ) − bnm (θi )) , converges to h(1 − θθji ).
This implies that for m large enough
0
u(cm (θj )) + h(1 − lm (θj ) − bnm (θj )) + βnm (θj )η wm
(θj )
θi lm (θi )
0
− bnm (θi ))
− u(cm (θi )) − βnm (θi )η wm
(θi ) ≥ h(1 −
θj

and for m large enough the allocation is incentive compatible. Therefore, The utility from
the constructed allocation is the following:
ŵm =

ηn

h
X η i X
−1 + β
Aj w̃ +
πj [h(1 − lm (θj ) − bnm (θj ))]
k

P
It is clear that ŵm ’s converge to −∞ and the allocation’s cost converges to − j πj θj .
Now since ŵm and wn converge to −∞, there exists subsequences ŵmk and wnk such that
ŵmk ≥ wnk and therefore by optimality:
X
j



1
πj cmk (θj ) − θj lmk (θj ) + nmk (θj )v̂(w̃) ≥ T v̂(wnk )
R
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and therefore,
−

X

πk θk ≥ lim inf T v̂(wn ) > −

X

n→∞

k

πk θk

k

and we have a contradiction. This completes the proof.
Since h (·) is unbounded below, given the above lemma for w ∈ R− low enough, allocations
should be interior and since we assume v is differentiable, positive Lagrange multipliers
λ, µ(θi , θj )|i>j must exists such that
#

"
u0 (c(θi , w)) π(θi )λ(w) +

X

µ(θi , θj ; w) −

j<i

X

µ(θj , θi ; w) = π(θi )

j>i

"

#

βn(θi , w)η−1 π(θi )λ(w) +

X

µ(θi , θj ; w) −

j<i

X
j>i

1
µ(θj , θi ; w) = π(θi ) v 0 (w0 (θi , w))
R

"

#

h0 (1 − l(θi , w) − bn(θi , w)) π(θi )λ(w) +

X

µ(θi , θj ; w)

j<i

−

X

µ(θj , θi ; w)

j>i

θi 0
θi l(θi , w)
h (1 −
− bn(θi , w)) = π(θi )θi
θj
θj

"

−bh0 (1 − l(θi , w) − bn(θi , w)) + βηn(θi , w)η−1 w0 (θi , w)

#
π(θi )λ(w) +

X

µ(θi , θj ; w)

j<i

−

X
j>i



θi l(θi , w)
η−1 0
0
µ(θj , θi ; w) −bh (1 −
− bn(θi , w)) + βηn(θi , w) w (θi , w)
θj

1
= π(θi ) v(w0 (θi , w))
R
By Lemma 3, we must have:
lim c(θj , w) = 0

w→−∞

lim n(θj , w) = 0

w→−∞

lim l(θj , w) = 1

w→−∞
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Then for every  > 0, there exists W such that for all w < W , we have u0 (c(θj , w)) >
M
, h0 (1 − l(θj , w) − bn(θj , w)) > M , for some large number M . This implies that‘

λ(w) =

X
j

π(θI )λ(w) +

X

µ(θn , θj ; w) =

j<I

⇒ µ(θI , θj ; w) <

πj
0
u (c(θj , w))

π(θI )
0
u (c(θI , w))

<

<


M


M


M

In addition,
π(θI−1 )λ(w) +

X

µ(θI−1 , θj ; w) − µ(θI , θI−1 ; w) =

j<I−1

⇒ µ(θI−1 , θj ; w) <

π(θI )
0
u (c(θI−1 , w))

<


M

2
M

By an induction argument, we have
µ(θj , θj ; w) <

zi 
M

where zI−1 = 1, zI−2 = 2, zI−i = zI−1 + · · · + zI−i+1 + 1. If we pick M so that z1 < M , we
have that
µ(θj , θj ; w) < , ∀w < W.
Next, we define the type specific resetting values, wi , as the values of w that solve the
following equations:
ηwv 0 (w) − v (w) = aR + bRθi .
Under our convexity assumptions, the left hand side – ηv 0 (w)w − v(w) – is strictly increasing
in w, so that if a solution exists, it is unique.
>From Proposition 7 we know that there is a wI such that:
ηv 0 (w)w − v(w) = aR + bRθI .
Moreover, from the first order conditions, we know that
ηv 0 (w0 (θi , w))w0 (θi , w) − v(w0 (θi , w)) ≤ aR + bRθi .
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Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique wi > −∞ which satisfies
ηv 0 (wi )wi − v(wi ) = aR + bRθi .
Moreover, by substituting first order conditions, we get
1 0 0
1
ηv (w (θi , w))w0 (θi , w) − π (θi ) v(w0 (θi , w))
R
R

X
θi
θi l(θi , w)
= π (θi ) bθi − b
1−
µ(θi , θj )h0 (1 −
− bn(θi , w))
θj
θj
j>i

X
θi l(θi , w)
θi
h0 (1 −
− bn(θi , w))
> π (θi ) bθi − b
1−
θ
θ
j
j
j>i

π (θi ) bθi ≥ π (θi )

Since hours worked converges to 1, the term multiplied by  in the above expression is
bounded away from ∞ as w → −∞. >From this it follows that
lim ηv 0 (w0 (θi , w))w0 (θi , w) − v(w0 (θi , w)) = aR + bRθi .

w→−∞

Continuity of v 0 implies that
lim w0 (θi , w) = wi .

w→−∞

This completes the proof.

B.2

Proof of Theorem 1

Before we prove the theorem, we need to construct a compact set of continuation utilities,
[w, w] such that:
1. For all w ∈ [w, w], there is a solution to problem Pt;
2. For all w ∈ [w, w], w0 (w, θ) ∈ [w, w];
3. n(w, θ) and w0 (w, θ) are continuous functions of w on [w, w];
4. γ(Ψ) is bounded away from zero for the probabilities on [w, w].
We proceed by defining w and w. For any fixed w < 0, consider the problem:
max

h(1 − bn) + βnη w.

n∈[0,1/b]

Note that there is a unique solution to this problem for every w < 0. Moreover, this
solution is continuous in w. Let g(w) denote the maximized value in this problem and note
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that it is strictly increasing in w. Because of this, limw→0 g(w) exists. In a slight abuse
of notation, let g(0) = limw→0 g(w). Further, since w < 0, it follows that g(w) < h(1) and
hence, g(0) ≤ h(1). In fact, g(0) = h(1). To see this, consider the sequences wk = −1/k, nk =
k 1/(2η) . Then, for k large enough, nk is feasible and therefore, g(wk ) ≥ h(1 − bnk ) + βnηk wk .
Hence,

h(1) =
=

lim h(1 − bnk ) − βk −1/2

k→∞

lim h(1 − bnk ) + βnηk wk ≤ lim g(wk ) = g(0) ≤ h(1).

k→∞

k

Thus, in a neighborhood of w = 0, g(w) < w.
Assume that b < 1 (thus, it is physically possible for the population to reproduce itself).
Then, it also follows that for w small enough, g(w) > w. Hence, there is at least one fixed
point for g. Since g is continuous, the set of fixed points is closed. Given this there is a
largest fixed point for g. Let w be this fixed point. Since g(w) < w in a neighborhood of 0,
it follows that w < 0. Following Corollary 3, choose w = w(w).
With these definitions, it follows that, as long as a solution to the functional equation
exists for all w ∈ [w, w], w0 (w, θ) ∈ [w, w]. i.e., requirement 2 above is satisfied.
As noted above, we have no way to guarantee from first principles that the requisite
convexity assumptions are satisfied to guarantee that a unique solution to the functional
equation exists and is unique (i.e., 1 and 3 above). Thus, we will simply assume that this
holds. Given this assumption, 4 can be shown to hold since n must be bounded away from
zero on [w, w] for the promise keeping constraint to be satisfied (i.e., n = 0 would imply
expected discounted utility is −∞).
Now we can proceed with the proof of theorem 1.
Proof. Since [w, w̄] is compact in R, by Riesz Representation Theorem (Dunford and
Schwartz (1958), IV.6.3), the space of regular measures is isomorphic to the space C ∗ ([w, w̄]),
the dual of the space of bounded continuous functions over [w, w̄]. Moreover, by BanachAlaoglu Theorem (Rudin (1991), Theorem 3.15), the set {Ψ ∈ C ∗ ([w, w̄]); ||Ψ|| ≤ k} is a
compact set in the weak-* topology for any k > 0. Equivalently the set of regular measures,
Ψ, with ||Ψ|| ≤ 1, is compact. Since non-negativity and full measure on [w, w̄] are closed
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restrictions, we must have that the set
{Ψ : Ψ a regular measure on [w, w̄], Ψ([w, w̄]) = 1, Ψ ≥ 0}
is compact in weak-* topology.
By definition,
ˆ
T (Ψ)(A) =

n
X

πi 1 {w0 (w, θi ) ∈ A} n(w, θi )dΨ(w).

[w,w̄] i=1

The assumption that the policy function is unique implies that it is continuous by the
Theorem of the Maximum. It also follows from this that n is bounded away from 0 on [w, w̄]
(since otherwise utility would be −∞). From this, it follows that T is continuous in Ψ.
Moreover,
ˆ
n
X
πi n(w, θi )dΨ(w) ≥ n > 0.
γ(Ψ) =
[w,w̄] i=1

is a continuous function of Ψ and is bounded away from zero.
Therefore, the function
T̂ (Ψ) =

T (Ψ)
: M([w, w̄]) → M([w, w̄])
γ(Ψ)

is continuous. Therefore, by Schauder-Tychonoff Theorem (Dunford and Schwartz (1958),
V.10.5), T̂ has a fixed point Ψ∗ ∈ M ([w, w̄]).

C

An Alternative Proof for Proposition 1

In this section we state and prove the main result of section 2 (proposition 1) without relying
on convexity and differentiability.
Suppose the size of the initial dynasty is N−1 and the promised utility to the head of
dynasty is W0 . Consider the minimization problem (P) in section
∞ X
X




1
t
t
t
t
min
π
θ
Y
θ
−
C
θ
−
aN
θ
t
t
t+1
{Ct (θt ),Yt (θt ),Nt+1 (θt )}∞
Rt
t=0
t
t=0
θ
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(19)

subject to
∞ X
X

t

t



β π θ Nt θ

θt

t=0


t−1 η

 



Ct (θt )
Yt (θt )
u
+h
, θt
= W0
Nt (θt−1 )
Nt (θt−1 )

and
∞ X
X
t=0

 



Ct (θt )
Yt (θt )
β π θ Nt θ
u
+h
, θt
≥
Nt (θt−1 )
Nt (θt−1 )
θt
 



∞ X
X


Ct (σt (θt ))
Yt (σt (θt ))
t−1 η
t
t
u
+h
, θt
β π θ Nt σt−1 θ
Nt (σt−1 (θt−1 ))
Nt (σt−1 (θt−1 ))
t
t=0
t

t




t−1 η

θ

for all σ ∈ Σ0
∗
(θt , N−1 , W0 ) and Yt∗ (θt , N−1 , W0 ) be the solution to this problem.
Let Ct∗ (θt , N−1 , W0 ), Nt+1
We call this solution the constrained efficient allocations. Define

c∗t (θt , N−1 , W0 ) ≡

Ct∗ (θt , N−1 , W0 )
,
Nt∗ (θt−1 , N−1 , W0 )

yt∗ (θt , N−1 , W0 ) ≡

Yt∗ (θt , N−1 , W0 )
Nt∗ (θt−1 , N−1 , W0 )

n∗t (θt , N−1 , W0 ) ≡

∗
Nt+1
(θt , N−1 , W0 )
Nt∗ (θt−1 , N−1 , W0 )

and

to be per capita consumption, effective unit of labor supply and per capita fertility for
generation after history θt . We first prove that after the initial generation, the per capita
allocations of consumption and effective labor supply do not depend on W0 (the promised
utility promised to the initial generation).
Proposition 9 Let c∗t (θt , N−1 , W0 ), yt∗ (θt , N−1 , W0 ) and n∗t (θt , N−1 , W0 ) be constrained efficient per capita consumption, effective unit of labor supply and per capita fertility. Then,
c∗t (θt , N−1 , W0 ), yt∗ (θt , N−1 , W0 ) and n∗t (θt , N−1 , W0 ) are i.i.d. and are independent of W0 for
any generation t > 0.
∗
Proof. Let Ct∗ (θt , N−1 , W0 ), Yt∗ (θt , N−1 , W0 ) and Nt+1
(θt , N−1 , W0 ) be solution to the prob-
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lem (19). For any history θt−1 define
Wt∗

θ

t−1



, W0 =

∞ X
X
s=t

s

β π (θ

s

) Ns∗ (θs−1 , N−1 , W0 )η

θs |θt−1

  ∗ s

Cs (θ , N−1 , W0 )
u
Ns∗ (θs−1 , N−1 , W0 )

 ∗ s
Ys (θ , N−1 , W0 )
, θs .
+h
Ns∗ (θs−1 , N−1 , W0 )


∗
(θs , N−1 , W0 )
The allocation Cs∗ (θs , N−1 , W0 ), Ys∗ (θs , N−1 , W0 ), Ns+1
lution to the following cost minimization problem for any history θt−1 :
min
s

{Cs (θs ),Ys (θ ),Ns+1 (θs )}θs |θt−1

−aN1 (θ0 ) +

∞ X
X
s=t θs |θt−1

θs |θt−1

must be a so-

1
π (θs ) [Ys (θs ) − Cs (θs ) − aNs+1 (θs )]
Rs
(20)

subject to
∞ X
X

s

s

β π (θ ) Ns θ


s−1 η

s=t θs |θt−1




 

Ys (θs )
Cs (θs )
+h
, θs
= Wt∗ θt−1 , W0
u
s−1
s−1
Ns (θ )
Ns (θ )

and
∞ X
X




 
Ys (θs )
Cs (θs )
+h
, θs
≥
β π (θ ) Ns θ
u
Ns (θs−1 )
Ns (θs−1 )
s=t θs |θt−1
!#
"

 !
∞ X
s |θ t−1
s |θ t−1
X

Y
σ
C
θ
σ
θ
η
s
s
s
s
+h
, θs
u
β s π (θs ) Ns σs−1 θs−1 |θt−1
Ns (σs−1 (θs−1 |θt−1 ))
Ns (σs−1 (θs−1 |θt−1 ))
s=t s t−1
s

s


s−1 η

θ |θ

for all σ ∈ Σ0 .

Suppose not. Then we can replace the solution to (19) (after each history θt−1 ) by the solution to this problem (for each history θt−1 ) and reduce the cost to the planner in problem
(19). Note that this allocation satisfies promise keeping in problem (19) by construction. It
is also incentive compatible. This is a contradiction.
The objective in (20) is homogenous of degree one and the constraint set is homogenous
of degree 1/η. It is straight-forward to show that after any history θt−1 :
Cs∗ (θs , N−1 , W0 ) = C̄s (θs , N−1 )Wt∗ θt−1 , W0
Ys∗ (θs , N−1 , W0 ) = Ȳs (θs , N−1 )Wt∗ θt−1 , W0

1/η

1/η

∗
(θs , N−1 , W0 ) = N̄s+1 (θs , N−1 )Wt∗ θt−1 , W0
Ns+1
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1/η

.

Therefore after any history θt−1 :
c∗s (θs , N−1 , W0 ) =

C̄s (θs , N−1 )
N̄s (θs−1 , N−1 )

ys∗ (θs , N−1 , W0 ) =

Ȳs (θs , N−1 )
,
N̄s (θs−1 , N−1 )

n∗s (θs , N−1 , W0 ) =

N̄s+1 (θs , N−1 )
.
N̄s (θs−1 , N−1 )

and

Note that the problem (20) depends on history θt−1 and W0 only through Wt∗ (θt−1 , W0 ).
Therefore, its solution depends on history θt−1 and W0 only through Wt∗ (θt−1 , W0 ). This
implies that c∗s (θs , N−1 , W0 ), ys∗ (θs , N−1 , W0 ) and n∗s (θs , N−1 , W0 ) do not depend on θt−1 and
W0 for s ≥ t. In particular c∗t (θt , N−1 , W0 ), yt∗ (θt , N−1 , W0 ) and n∗t (θt , N−1 , W0 ) depend only
on θt (and N−1 ), i.e., they are i.i.d.
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